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Doing Adult Time for Juvenile Crime:
When the Charge, Not the Conviction,
Spells Prison for Kids
Paula R. Brummel*
Introduction
In September 1995, a Minnesota jury convicted Donn Behl
("Beh") of second-degree manslaughter.' At the time, Behl was a
sixteen-year-old without prior offenses. 2 Under Minnesota law, a
juvenile convicted of second-degree manslaughter would typically
receive a juvenile disposition.3 Beh's sentence, however, was
drastically different: not only did he receive an adult sentence, 4
but "[n]o adult ha[d] received a longer sentence for this offense in
recent reported cases."5
Although Behl was a juvenile, he was certified under Minne-
sota's automatic certification statute to stand trial as an adult.
6
This automatic certification statute provides that "[t]he term de-
linquent child does not include a child alleged to have committed
murder in the first degree after becoming 16 years of age, but the
term delinquent child does include a child alleged to have commit-
* J.D. University of Minnesota Law School, expected 1999; B.S. Augsburg
College, 1996. Special thanks to Dan Foix and Beth Docherty for their editing as-
sistance.
1. See State v. Behl, 547 N.W.2d 382, 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
the district court had properly retained jurisdiction over juvenile for sentencing
when indicted by grand jury for first-degree murder, regardless of fact that jury
only found him guilty of second-degree manslaughter).
2. See id.
3. See Juvenile Court Act, MINN. STAT. § 260.126 (1996). A conviction of sec-
ond-degree manslaughter would qualify Behl for the Extended Jurisdiction Juve-
nile (EJJ) category. See infra note 18 (explaining the EJJ category and how it en-
ables the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction of serious juvenile offenders, with an
adult sentence held over the juvenile if the juvenile fails probation or treatment).
4. See Behl, 547 N.W.2d at 384 (reporting the district court's sentence of
Behl).
5. State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 571 n.2 (Minn. 1997) (Keith, C.J., dissent-
ing). In Behl's case, the sentencing court upwardly departed 25% from the adult
sentencing guidelines, giving him a 72-month prison sentence instead of the pre-
sumptive 58-month sentence for second-degree manslaughter. See id.
6. See id. (describing how "the state automatically certified Behl as an adult").
Law and Inequality
ted attempted murder in the first degree." 7 Because the prosecutor
charged the sixteen-year-old Behl with first-degree murder,8 Behl
was statutorily precluded from being considered a delinquent
child9 and was automatically certified to stand trial as an adult.10
After a grand jury indicted Behl on first-degree murder, a
trial jury acquitted him of that charge, and instead convicted him
of second-degree manslaughter. 1 Due to the silence of the statute
regarding the sentencing of juveniles who are ultimately convicted
of a lesser charge than first-degree murder,1 2 the trial court ruled
that Behl could not return to juvenile court for sentencing. 13 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's decision. 14
Once certified and tried as an adult, a juvenile may be sen-
tenced as an adult. A sentencing court, in its discretion, may up-
wardly depart from statutory guidelines when determining sen-
tence length.' 5 The Behl sentencing court found that aggravating
circumstances warranted an upward departure, 16 but failed to rec-
7. MINN. STAT. § 260.015 subd. 5(b) (1996) (emphasis added). This statute is
pivotal to this Article and is discussed at greater length in Part I. It is referred to
as both a "legislative waiver" and an "automatic certification statute." I will usu-
ally refer to it as the automatic certification statute, because under its authority, a
juvenile is automatically certified to stand trial as an adult without any further
review or hearing. To certify a juvenile means to treat the juvenile as an adult for
trial or sentencing purposes. The sentencing of certified juveniles is the focus of
this Article.




11. See State v. Behl, 547 N.W.2d 382, 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that
the jury found Behl not guilty of first-degree murder, but "guilty of three criminal
counts, including second degree manslaughter in violation of Minn. Stat. §
609.205, subd. 1").
12. See MINN. STAT. § 260.015 subd. 5(b)(1996). The statute makes no mention
of returning juveniles to juvenile court jurisdiction once they have been tried as
adults. Of the states that waive juveniles into adult criminal court, only 11 pro-
vide a reverse waiver, or transfer-back provision to juvenile court. See infra note
39 (citing the statutes that provide a transfer-back in their waiver statutes).
13. See Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 562 (describing trial court's decision); see also
Behl, 547 N.W.2d at 384 (describing trial court's decision).
14. See Behl, 547 N.W.2d at 382 (affirming the trial court's sentence); Behl, 564
N.W.2d at 560 (affirming the Minnesota Court of Appeals' decision to keep Behl in
adult court for sentencing).
15. See Behl, 547 N.W.2d at 384 (describing trial court's upward departure in
sentencing). If the court finds that "substantial and compelling" aggravating cir-
cumstances are present, it may increase a sentence. Id. (quoting State v. Davis,
540 N.W.2d 88, 91 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing State v. Garcia, 302 N.W.2d 643,
647 (Minn. 1981)).
16. The sentencing court based the upward departure in sentencing Behl on
four factors: "(1) Behl entered the victim's bedroom and shot him within his per-
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ognize that Behl should not have been sentenced in adult court
since he was not convicted of first-degree murder. 17
This Article highlights the serious sentencing inequities that
result when a state's statutory waiver of juvenile jurisdiction con-
tains no reverse waiver or transfer-back provision. As Behl dem-
onstrates, two Minnesota juveniles convicted of second-degree
manslaughter may receive drastically different sentences. In one
scenario, a juvenile charged with and convicted of second-degree
manslaughter is monitored and rehabilitated through the juvenile
court system until the age of twenty-one. 18 In the other scenario, a
juvenile charged with first-degree murder, but convicted of second-
degree manslaughter, is incarcerated for six years with hardened
adult offenders, and is released from prison at age twenty-two. 19
sonal zone of privacy; (2) Behl failed to render or call for help; (3) at trial, Behl
tried to blame the shooting on the victim's brother; and (4) Behl stole the victim's
truck to avoid capture after the shooting." Id. at 386. The court of appeals agreed
with this reasoning, but disregarded factor number two in its analysis because the
victim had died instantly. See Behl, 547 N.W.2d at 386.
17. This Article argues that if a juvenile is certified to stand trial as an adult
based on his charges, he should be returned to juvenile court if the jury acquits
him of those charges. Behl entered the adult court system via Minnesota's auto-
matic certification statute: "Ithe term delinquent child does not include a child
alleged to have committed murder in the first degree after becoming 16 years of
age, but the term delinquent child does include a child alleged to have committed
attempted murder in the first degree." MiNN. STAT. § 260.015 subd. 5(b) (1996);
see also Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 562 (citing MINN. STAT. § 260.015 subd. 5(b)); infra
text accompanying notes 34-40 (explaining the different waiver statutes and the
impact of automatic certification).
18. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126. Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction ("EJJ") is a ju-
venile classification for serious repeat offenders; it is a legislative attempt to reha-
bilitate serious repeat juvenile offenders who have committed offenses other than
first-degree murder. See id. at subd. 6. It applies to juveniles between the ages of
14 and 17 years of age. See id. at subd. 1-2. Juveniles are designated EJJ either
by the court or at the request of the prosecutor. See id. Upon designation, a certi-
fication hearing takes place, at which the prosecutor must show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that adjudicating the juvenile EJJ will serve public safety. Once
designated EJJ, the juvenile is tried in juvenile court with the same procedural
safeguards as an adult, such as the right to a jury trial. See id. at subd. 3. The
juvenile court judge imposes both a juvenile disposition and an adult sentence.
See id. at subd. 4. The adult sentence is stayed until the juvenile completes the
terms of the disposition. See id. at subd. 5. If the juvenile violates the terms of
the disposition or commits another offense, the adult sentence is implemented
without further ado. See id.; see also Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Pol-
icy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1038-51
(1995) [hereinafter Feld, Violent Youth] (describing the provisions of EJJ and how
it evolved). Feld underscores the fact that first-degree murder is excluded from
the EJJ classification, and traces EJJ's genesis in the Minnesota Advisory Task
Force, on which he served. See infra notes 43-54 and accompanying text
(describing the evolution of the Minnesota Advisory Task Force).
19. Behl received this sentence. See Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 563 (summarizing
the sentencing strategy of the district court).
1998]
Law and Inequality
Part I of this Article introduces the three types of statutory
waivers that provide for the certification of juveniles as adults.
Part I examines the role of the Minnesota Advisory Task Force in
the evolution of Minnesota's legislative waiver statute, the role of
the grand jury in the process and relevant case law. Part II pro-
vides the facts and holding of Behl. Part III analyzes the Minne-
sota Supreme Court's decision in Behl in light of public policy, leg-
islative intent and statutory silence. Part III concludes that the
lack of a reverse Waiver or transfer-back provision permits Minne-
sota courts to misapply the legislative waiver when sentencing
some juveniles. Part IV proposes that Minnesota's legislative
waiver statute be amended to include a transfer-back provision,
which would protect juveniles charged with first-degree murder
but convicted of lesser offenses, without jeopardizing the jurisdic-
tion of adult courts over juveniles convicted of first-degree mur-
der. 20
I. Statutory Waivers of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
Since the creation of the American juvenile justice system,21
courts and legislatures have struggled when deciding whether to
adjudicate serious juvenile offenders in juvenile court 22 or adult
court.23 Although the American justice system once routinely in-
carcerated children with adults, 24 it now prefers rehabilitation to
20. This amendment would allow courts to check prosecutorial overcharging
while still preserving courts' authority to send juveniles convicted of first-degree
murder to prison.
21. Illinois established the first juvenile court in the United States in 1899.
See Mabel Arteaga, Juvenile Justice With a Future for Juveniles, 2 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 215, 216 (1995). "[Bly 1945, every state had its own juvenile justice
system." Stacey Sabo, Rights of Passage: An Analysis of Waiver of Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2430 (1996).
22. See generally Arteaga, supra note 21 (tracing the origins of the juvenile
court in the United States and the evolution of procedural and substantive protec-
tions for children in that system). The impetus for this bifurcation was the reali-
zation that children, because of their youth and vulnerability, are not always
aware of the wrongfulness of their acts. See id. at 217. Following the lead of the
Illinois court, the rest of the country developed a separate justice system for juve-
niles with more emphasis on treatment and rehabilitation than on punishment.
See id. This development saw the birth of parens patriae. See generally Lawrence
B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978)
(examining the beginnings of the doctrine in England). For a brief definition of the
parens patriae doctrine, see infra note 30.
23. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense:
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
471, 483-503 (1987) [hereinafter Feld, The Juvenile Court] (discussing the differ-
ences between juvenile and criminal proceedings, and explaining the classification
of youths as juveniles or adults for adjudication purposes).
24. See Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31
[Vol. 16:541
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incarceration. 25 Some children are too young to know their acts
are wrong, while others are conditioned by their family or envi-
ronment to believe that criminal acts are harmless or even neces-
sary.26 The dual court system exists because policy-makers believe
that juveniles are emotionally and developmentally different from
adults and therefore have different disposition needs.
27
The age of the juvenile offender and the seriousness of his28
offense historically have been the criteria used to make disposition
decisions. 29 As state legislators draft delinquency statutes, tension
develops between the parens patriae3 o obligation to protect the
UCLA L. REV. 503, 509-13 (1984) (describing the outgrowth of the American juve-
nile justice system from the common law).
25. The presumption that children are too young to understand the wrongful-
ness of their acts initiated the common law infancy defense. See id. This legal de-
fense eventually gave rise to the present juvenile court system at the end of the
nineteenth century. See Arteaga, supra note 21, at 216.
26. Arteaga's article gives the example of "Johnny," a 13-year-old boy whose
mother is a drug addict, whose father is a pimp, and whose notion of "the right
thing" is stealing and being rough with women. See Arteaga, supra note 21, at
215.
27. See Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules for Procedure for
the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141 (1984) [hereinafter Feld, Criminalizing].
The word "disposition" is used instead of "sentence" when referring to juveniles. A
disposition may involve an assignment to a group home, residential treatment cen-
ter or community service program. It may also include chemical-dependency
treatment.
28. This Article uses the pronoun "he" when referring to juveniles in general
because of the preponderance of male juvenile offenders. However, every provision
and condition of this topic equally applies to females and males.
29. See Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 18, at 1052. Various criminal experts,
legal practitioners, scholars and criminologists have different opinions on the cri-
teria for when the juvenile should be tried in adult court. Minnesota Attorney
General, Hubert H. Humphrey III, for example, advocated that all juveniles 16
years of age or older go to adult court if charged with offenses carrying prison sen-
tences. See id. (citing a Statement of Attorney General Humphrey on the 1993
Criminal Justice Initiatives: Gang Violence and Juvenile Justice Proposals 3 (Jan.
13, 1993)). At one time, Professor Feld advocated that the offense should deter-
mine which court should try the juvenile, but 17 years later he found the empirical
results disturbing. See Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 18, at 1051 (referring to
opinions he wrote in Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecutions: The
Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515,
551-54 (1978)). Some critics warn that making the offense the determining factor
will cause the court to lose discretion in adjudicating juveniles, resulting in sub-
stantially higher numbers of juveniles in adult criminal court. See id. (citing
Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in American Juvenile Justice:
In Defense of Discretionary Waiver, NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoLy 267,
273 (1991)).
30. "Parens patriae" generally refers to the "role of state as sovereign and
guardian of persons under legal disability," such as infants and those with a men-
tal disability. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). The court under the
doctrine of parens patriae, while concerned with the "best interests" of the child,
was initially completely free from imposed procedural protections. See Arteaga,
supra note 21, at 217. The adjudication of juveniles was entirely within the discre-
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best interests of children and the need to respond to the public's
concern that juvenile crime is out of control.3 1 As the public per-
ceives juvenile gun use and gang involvement to be increasing,3 2
the trend in most juvenile courts has been to focus on the offense
charged when determining jurisdiction. 33
States may waive juvenile court jurisdiction over juveniles
legislatively, 34 judicially35 or prosecutorially. 36 Minnesota exercises
legislative waiver via Minnesota Statute 260.015 subdivision
tion of the court, and it was not until Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966),
that the Supreme Court held that juveniles have certain constitutionally-protected
procedural due process rights.
31. See Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 18, at 977, 982-86 (describing the pub-
lic's inaccurate perception of juvenile crime patterns and the contribution mass
media made to this perception).
32. See id. at 983 (analyzing public perception resulting from Minnesota news-
paper and television coverage portraying random gun and gang-related violence
perpetrated by youthful offenders).
33. See Arteaga, supra note 21, at 219 (asserting that the trend in modern ju-
venile courts is "to focus on public safety, punishment and individualized account-
ability in addition to the best interests of the child") (citing Barry C. Feld, The Ju-
venile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Punishment, Treatment and the
Differences It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 842 (1988)). If true, this approach seems
to take a turn from the rehabilitative direction juvenile courts have followed since
the end of the nineteenth century. It signals a return to a pre-twentieth century
attitude where juveniles over the age of 14 were presumed to have the capacity to
commit criminal acts and to be punished for them.
34. See Sabo, supra note 21, at 2425-28 (providing a detailed explanation (and
complete listing) of the three types of statutory waivers that certify juveniles to
stand trial as adults); see also Feld, The Juvenile Court, supra note 23, at 488
(giving an extensive background and analysis of waivers that can automatically
certify a serious juvenile offender to adult court jurisdiction).
35. See Feld, The Juvenile Court, supra note 23, at 488. Judicial waiver gives
the judge discretion to decide jurisdiction after a hearing where the state and the
defendant present their arguments regarding the juvenile's amenability to juvenile
court disposition. Where judicial waiver is in force, statutes list criteria to be con-
sidered when certifying juveniles as adults. Florida's judicial waiver statute, for
example, requires the court to consider the nature of the offense, its seriousness,
community welfare, the victim (person or property), the juvenile's sophistication,
maturity, and previous history, the effect of treatment on the juvenile versus the
public's safety and the likelihood of the juvenile's rehabilitation. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 39.052(2)(c) (West Supp. 1996). According to Sabo, forty-seven states and
the District of Columbia have judicial waiver statutes. See Sabo, supra note 21, at
2427 n. 18 (listing the statutes with judicial waiver provisions).
36. Prosecutorial waiver vests exclusive discretion with the prosecutor when
both adult and juvenile courts have jurisdiction over the juvenile. Nine states and
the District of Columbia give prosecutors discretion to waive juveniles into adult
criminal court: Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Lou-
isiana, Michigan, Nebraska, Vermont and Wyoming. See Sabo, supra note 21, at
2439 & n.105 (listing the 10 relevant statutes). The prosecutor chooses in which
court to charge the juvenile based on the juvenile's age and offense(s). See id. at
2426. Where prosecutorial waiver exists, and either court can have jurisdiction,
the prosecutor may make the final decision. See id.
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5(b).37 Legislative waivers statutorily exclude juveniles from juve-
nile court jurisdiction by virtue of their age or because they are
charged with a certain offense(s).3 8 Of the thirty-eight legislative
waiver states, only eleven have transfer-back provisions. 39 Minne-
sota is not one of them. While initially it may seem that making
the charged offense(s) determinative of jurisdiction is a simple and
logical alternative, this approach can be imprecise and over-
broad. 40  Without a transfer-back provision, an offense-
determinative waiver risks that juveniles will be sent to prison as
a result of prosecutorial overcharging.
A. The Minnesota Advisory Task Force
In 1992, the Minnesota Legislature sought to simplify the is-
sue of juvenile-offender jurisdiction and to remove various discre-
tionary aspects of the certification process. 41 Prior to that time,
the certification process had been confusing and subject to un-
guided judicial discretion.42 Specifically, the Legislature directed
37. See supra note 17 for the language of the Minnesota legislative waiver
statute. See Sabo, supra note 21 at 2443 n.135 (listing the 37 state statutes that
have legislative waivers). See also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419C.364 (1995)
(permitting the criminal court judge, in certain circumstances, to order all pro-
ceedings involving the juvenile waived to criminal court without any juvenile court
proceedings).
38. Because legislative waiver, which is also called offense exclusion, removes
a youth from juvenile jurisdiction based on the charge(s), it reflects a retribution-
based criminal justice system rather than a rehabilitation-based one. See gener-
ally Feld, The Juvenile Court, supra note 23, at 488 (giving an extensive back-
ground on juvenile court waivers, and a history of the evolution of juvenile court in
the United States); see also Sabo, supra note 21, at 2427-28, 2443-45 (introducing
and defining legislative waivers). See, e.g., supra note 17 (quoting Minnesota's
legislative waiver statute).
39. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1011(A)-(B) (Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. §
15-11-5(B)(2)(B) (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 640.010(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1990 & Supp. 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-157(8) (Supp. 1995); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 62.080(3) (Michie Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:25
(1994 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 190.71, 210.43 (McKinney 1993);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7306-1.1(E) (West Supp. 1996); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 6322(a) (1982 & Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5505(a)-(b)
(1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 970.032 (West Supp. 1995).
40. See Zimring, supra note 29, at 273-74 (explaining that most legislatures
consider overbreadth in offense classifications necessary to provide for the worst
juvenile cases). Zimring maintains, however, that limiting the court to offenses
and prior records when deciding jurisdiction for juveniles will "multipl[y] several
times over the number of juvenile offenders transferred to adult court." Id.
41. See ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, MINNESOTA
SUPREME COURT FINAL REPORT 26-27 (1994) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]
(detailing recommendations for simplifying the certification process, in addition to
recommendations on other areas of the juvenile justice system).
42. See id. (explaining that the then-current prima facie system was "confusing
and unworkable" and that the courts' discretion needed guidance).
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the Minnesota Supreme Court to create an Advisory Task Force on
the Juvenile Justice System ("Task Force").43 The mission of the
Task Force was, inter alia, to establish a clear guide for judges in
certifying juvenile offenders as adults.44 In 1994, the Task Force
made its final recommendations. The Task Force recommended
that public safety play a major role in certification 45 and proposed
reducing the criteria to determine the threat to public safety from
eleven factors to five.46
While members of the Task Force were concerned that de-
termining jurisdiction of juveniles by offense(s) would be danger-
ously over-broad, 47 they recognized that older, serious offenders
would be more appropriate for adult court adjudication.48  Ulti-
mately, the Task Force recommended that for the purpose of certi-
fication, juveniles should be divided into two groups: Presump-
tively Certifiable 49 and Serious Youthful Offender ("SYO"). The
43. See 1992 Minn. Laws 571, art. 7 § 13; see also Feld, Violent Youth, supra
note 18, at 986 & n.90 (outlining the Task Force's objectives and the legislators'
differing priorities, from "getting tough" to expanding juvenile procedural protec-
tions). The Task Force, chaired by Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Sandra
Gardebring, was composed of 27 people who were private citizens, community
leaders, judges, attorneys, legislators, law professors, law enforcement personnel,
corrections officials, probation officers and state agency staff. See Symposium, Ju-
venile Justice Report, Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Task Force on the Juve-
nile Justice System: Final Report, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 595, 598 (1994)
[hereinafter Symposium]; see also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at iii.
44. See Symposium, supra note 43, at 597. The Task Force was charged with
making recommendations concerning:
1) The juvenile certification process; 2) the retention of juvenile delin-
quency adjudication records and their use in subsequent adult proceed-
ings; 3) the feasibility of a system of statewide juvenile guidelines; 4) the
effectiveness of various juvenile justice system approaches, including be-
havior modification and treatment; 5) the extension to juveniles of a non-
waivable right to counsel and a right to a jury trial; [and] 6) the need for
secure juvenile facilities in the state.
Id.
45. See id. (proposing that the risk to public safety be the key factor in certify-
ing serious juvenile offenders).
46. The five factors that the Task Force recommended judges should use to de-
termine the juvenile's threat to public safety were: "1) seriousness of the present
offense; 2) culpability of the juvenile; 3) prior record of delinquency; 4) prior pro-
gram history; and 5) disposition options." Id.
47. See Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 18, at 1052-53 (describing the tension
between the legislature's desire to be seen as being tough on crime and the Task
Force's reluctance to incarcerate juveniles who could be successfully rehabilitated).
48. See id.
49. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 29-30 (outlining the recommen-
dations for a change in the certification of juveniles as adults). The Task Force
recommended that under the presumptive certification system, if the juvenile is
"16 or 17 years old at the time of the offense" and the offense could result in a
"presumptive commitment to prison under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines,"
the burden of proof that the juvenile should remain in juvenile court shifts to and
[Vol. 16:541
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Task Force recommended that if a court found a juvenile presump-
tively certifiable pursuant to a felony charge,50 the burden of proof
would shift to the juvenile to show why he should remain under
juvenile court jurisdiction.5' If the juvenile convinced the court
that he should remain under juvenile jurisdiction, he would be
designated SYO and permitted to remain under juvenile court ju-
risdiction.52 If the juvenile failed to convince the court that he
should remain under juvenile jurisdiction, he would be certified to
adult court jurisdiction for trial and sentencing.5 3 These two clas-
sifications ultimately became Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile
("EJJ") and the legislative waiver statute.54
It is important to note that the Task Force recommended that
a juvenile designated SYO be allowed to transfer-back to regular
juvenile status if acquitted of the original SYO charge and con-
remains with the defense. Id.; see also Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 18, at 1024;
Symposium, supra note 43, at 600.
Under Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, presumptive commit-to-prison of-
fenses were "murder in the first, second, or third degree; assault in the first, sec-
ond, or third degree; burglary; kidnapping; false imprisonment; manslaughter in
the first or second degree; aggravated robbery; simple robbery; criminal sexual
conduct; ... escape from custody; arson in the first, second, or third degree; drive-
by shooting;.., a felony [drug offense]; or any attempt to commit any of these of-
fenses." MINN. STAT. § 609.11(9) (1996); see also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
41, at 27 n.92.
50. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 36 (outlining the recommenda-
tions for the SYO category); Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 18, at 1024 (describing
the SYO category); see also Symposium, supra note 43, at 602-03 (explaining that
the SYO category was designed for older, serious, repeat offenders). The SYO
would remain under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court but would receive a
stayed adult sentence. See id. If the SYO committed a new offense or violated his
probation, the adult sentence would be imposed. See id.
51. See Symposium, supra note 43, at 601 (proposing that under the new pre-
sumptive certification standard, the juvenile should "show by clear and convincing
evidence that [he] is suitable for treatment within the juvenile system consistent
with public safety," or should be retained in juvenile court under the SYO cate-
gory).
52. The Task Force recommended that the designation of SYO remain effective
until the juvenile attained 23 years of age. See id. at 604. The juvenile designated
a SYO would receive an adult sentence that would be stayed pending successful
completion of therapy, treatment or probation. See id. If the juvenile was newly
charged after turning the age of majority, he would be tried as an adult for that
new charge, and the SYO adult sentence could be imposed concurrently. See id.
53. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 27-28 (including a flow chart to
illustrate the Task Force's recommended certification process).
54. See MINN. STAT. §§ 260.011-.301 (1996). The SYO category was the precur-
sor to the EJJ statute. See generally MINN. STAT. § 260.126 (1996) (outlining the
EJJ requirements). The legislature changed the name from "Serious Youthful Of-
fender" to "Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile" to make it a less glamorous label and
therefore less appealing to youths. See Patricia L. Baden, Senate OK's Juvenile
Crime Bill; Violent Youths Could Get Adult Penalties, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Apr. 30, 1994, at 1B, (quoting Senator Jane Ranum, the Senate bill's sponsor).
1998]
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victed of a lesser one.5 5 By including a transfer-back provision
within the SYO category, the Task Force demonstrated its intent
to protect juveniles from prosecutorial overcharging.5 6 It recog-
nized that if juveniles were to be categorized pursuant to charges,
there needed to be a mechanism to offer jurisdictional recovery if
the juveniles were acquitted of the charges.
To appreciate the legislative intent of the final Minnesota ju-
venile court statute,57 one must examine and understand the in-
tent of the Task Force's Presumptively Certifiable and SYO rec-
ommendations. 58 As one examines Minnesota's legislative waiver
statute and EJJ designation, one must recognize that both grew
out of the Task Force's recommendations. 59
55. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 36. Concerning the SYO cate-
gory, the Task Force Report stated: "[ilf it is later determined that the offense at
plea or conviction is less serious than originally charged, the designation would be
removed and the juvenile returned to regular juvenile status for disposition." Id.
Barry Feld notes that the language of the Task Force's recommendation to allow
juveniles to reclaim "regular juvenile status became known as the 'bounce back'
provision." Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 18, at 1043 n.330.
56. See Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 18, at 1043 & n.330 (stating that Feld's
experience as a former prosecutor made him aware of the "potentials for abuse of
prosecutorial overcharging"). Overcharging has long been part of the prosecutorial
system; it gives both sides room to plea bargain and negotiate. See Richard S.
Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do
the French Do it, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CALIF. L.
REV. 539, 626-28 (1990) (comparing the French and American systems, and re-
porting that American plea bargaining has been attacked for encouraging prosecu-
tors to overcharge); see also Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal
Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, in THIRTEENTH
ANNUAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND
COURTS OF APPEALS 1982-1983, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 217 & n.183 (1983) (conceding
that the charging decision often reflects financial and tactical considerations,
which have little to do with the defendant's alleged crime). Arenella states that
the rule that the conviction cannot supersede the original charge encourages
prosecutors to overcharge initially. See id. at 217 n. 183.
57. See MINN. STAT. §§ 260.011-.301 (1996).
58. If the presumptive certification recommendation led to the final automatic
certification statute, the purpose and intent of the former sheds light on the pur-
pose and intent of the latter. Likewise, the reasons for protection against prosecu-
torial overcharging within the SYO category apply to the final EJJ category and
legislative waiver statute. See supra note 50 (demonstrating that the SYO cate-
gory was the precursor for the current EJJ category).
59. Without the Task Force's recommendations, it is unlikely that the Minne-
sota Legislature would have known how to improve the old certification statute.
The Legislature probably would not have developed the EJJ designation without
the Task Force's findings and experience. The final statutes incorporated much of
the Task Force's recommendations, and those recommendations reflect public pol-
icy. Therefore a close examination of the Task Force Report gives insight into
legislative intent.
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B. The Evolution of Minnesota's Legislative Waiver Statute
The Task Force recommended the creation of Presumptively
Certifiable 60 and SYO categories for juvenile offenders. 6 1 Neither
recommendation mentioned a legislative waiver or an automatic
certification statute; hence, no transfer-back provision was dis-
cussed. Prior to the enactment of Minnesota's legislative waiver,
62
juvenile courts had broad discretion in deciding whether a juvenile
offender should be certified to adult court. 63 The Task Force
sought to guide and limit this judicial discretion by introducing a
framework to replace the prior system.6 4
When the Task Force's recommendations were drafted into
bills, political reaction was mixed.65 Legislators agreed that the
certification system should be simplified but disagreed on the
60. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 5-6 (outlining the recommenda-
tions for the Certification Process).
61. See id. at 7-8, 32-37 (outlining the reasons and recommendations for the
SYO category).
62. See MINN. STAT. § 260.015 subd. 5(b) (West 1996). Note that if the charge
is attempted first-degree murder, the juvenile is considered a delinquent child for
purposes of adjudication. See id.
63. Until the 1994 Juvenile Crime Act, the two criteria that courts used to de-
termine juvenile certification were (1) probable cause that the child committed the
offense and (2) clear and convincing evidence that the child was not amenable to
treatment. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125 subd. 2(d)(1)-(2) (1992). The juvenile court
considered the following factors in certifying a juvenile for adult court jurisdiction:
a) the seriousness of the offense in terms of community protection,
b) the circumstances surrounding the offense,
c) whether the offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premedi-
tated or willful manner,
d) whether the offense was directed against persons or property, the
greater weight being given to an offense against persons, especially if per-
sonal injury resulted,
e) the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the act,
f) the absence of adequate protective and security facilities available to
the juvenile treatment system,
g) the sophistication and maturity of the child as determined by consid-
eration of the child's home, environmental situation, emotional attitude
and pattern of living,
h) the record and previous history of the child,
i) whether the child acted with particular cruelty or disregard for the life
or safety of another,
j) whether the offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning
by the child, and
k) whether there is sufficient time available before the child reaches age
nineteen (19) to provide appropriate treatment and control.
MINN. R. Juv. P. 32.05 subd. 2, in MINNESOTA RULES OF COURT (West 1993).
64. See Symposium, supra note 43, at 628-29 (stating that "the Task Force
heard testimony that indicated that the [then-] current prima facie system [was]
confusing and unworkable").
65. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (describing the differences
between the House and Senate versions of the juvenile justice reform bills).
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proper extent of the simplification. 66 House members proposed
that three or more offenses should automatically certify juveniles
as adults;67 Senate members proposed that no offenses should
automatically certify juveniles. 68
In an attempt to keep juvenile offenders in juvenile court as
long as possible, yet appease the "get tough on crime" legislators, 69
the House and Senate ultimately compromised. 70 The resulting
statute automatically certifies as adults those juveniles who are
sixteen-years-old or older and are charged with first-degree mur-
der. 71 Thus, Minnesota's legislative waiver statute to automati-
cally certify juveniles was created.7 2
Under current Minnesota law, only a first-degree murder
charge, followed by an indictment, automatically certifies a juve-
nile as an adult.73 If the murder charge is reduced to a lesser con-
viction, there is no transfer-back provision to juvenile court.74 The
66. Simplification of the then-current certification process was the reason be-
hind the formation of the Task Force and the response to a legislative mandate.
See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41 (making recommendations con-
cerning the juvenile justice system).
67. The House version of the bill, as amended on March 14, 1994, proposed
that charges of first-degree murder, intentional second-degree murder and first-
degree criminal sexual conduct automatically certify youths 16 years or older to
adult court. See MINN. H.F. 2074, 78th Leg., § 10 (1994).
68. See MINN. S.F. 1845, 78th Leg., § 11 (1994). Although this bill listed no
excluding offenses which would automatically certify a juvenile as an adult, an-
other bill from the same session proposed that offenses similar to those in the
House bill be included. See MINN. S.F. 2164, 78th Leg., § 4 (1994).
69. Hearings on H.F. 2074 before the Judiciary Conference Comm., 78th Leg.,
(Apr. 21, 1994) (transcribed by and on file with the author) (statement of Repre-
sentative Phil Carruthers) ("I think we'd have a problem if we didn't come back
with some automatic certification provisions. I think we'd have a major problem
trying to come back to the House on that.").
70. See Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 18, at 1055 (explaining how the legisla-
ture arrived at a "package deal" that incorporated the Task Force's recommenda-
tions and the first-degree murder offense as a means to certify automatically a ju-
venile to adult court jurisdiction).
71. See MINN. STAT. § 260.015 subd. 5 (1996); see also supra note 17 (quoting
the statute).
72. See MINN. STAT. § 260.015 subd. 5 (1996).
73. See Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 18, at 1056. A first-degree murder in-
dictment of a juvenile 16 years old or older gives the adult criminal court jurisdic-
tion to try that juvenile. See id. The fact that only one offense, first-degree mur-
der, can automatically certify a juvenile as an adult testifies to the legislature's
high priority in keeping juveniles under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice sys-
tem.
74. "Conviction" is not even part of the statute's language. See MINN. STAT. §§
260.011-.015. The Task Force's SYO proposal included a transfer-back option: "If
it is later determined that the offense at plea or conviction is not a presumptive
commit to prison offense, the [SYO] designation would be removed and the juve-
nile returned to regular juvenile status for disposition." TASK FORCE REPORT, su-
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Minnesota legislative waiver statute is silent about which jurisdic-
tion prevails for sentencing if the jury convicts the juvenile of a
lesser offense than the first-degree murder charge. 75
C. The Role of the Grand Jury: Indictment
"[A] grand jury would indict a ham sandwich if asked to do so
by a prosecutor."76  Grand juries see only one side: "You have
roughly twenty citizens, who only hear the state's evidence, and
whose job it is to decide if there's enough probable cause to war-
rant a trial. The defense isn't even present."77
The purpose of a grand jury hearing is to determine, through
the investigation of evidence and witnesses, whether a crime has
been committed,78 and whether criminal proceedings should com-
mence against an individual.79 A grand jury, by virtue of its inves-
tigative function, is relatively free from the strict procedural safe-
guards that a trial jury must follow.8 0 The grand jury acts as a
shield between the prosecutor and the court, and is designed to
prevent the weakest cases from going to trial and wasting the
court's time.8 '
pra note 41 (emphasis added) (outlining the "bounce-back" or transfer-back provi-
sion in the SYO category); see also Symposium, supra note 43, at 602-03
(enumerating elements of the SYO, including the transfer-back option).
75. See MINN. STAT. §§ 260.011-.015.
76. TOM WOLFE, BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES 603 (1987) (quoting former Chief
Judge Sol Wachtler of the New York Court of Appeals).
77. Interview with Jeffrey Rasmussen, Disposition Advisor for Hennepin
County Public Defender, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Sept. 18, 1997) (notes from con-
versation on file with author).
78. See U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344 (1974) (holding that a witness
summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury may not refuse to answer
questions on the grounds that the evidence was obtained from an unlawful search
and seizure). The grand jury investigation "is not fully carried out until every
available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every proper way
to find if a crime has been committed." U.S. v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir.
1970).
79. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343-44. In determining whether criminal pro-
ceedings should be instituted against a person, or whether a crime has been com-
mitted, the grand jury hearing focuses on the offense, not the guilt or innocence of
the accused. See id.
80. See Robert M. Paule, The Pervasion of the Historic Function of the Grand
Jury in Minnesota, 7 LAW & INEQ. J. 299, 307 (1989) (describing the duties of ju-
ries in Minnesota).
81. See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the
Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 290 (1995). Leipold analyzes the grand jury sys-
tem and suggests that it does not work as a valid screening function. See id. at
294. "[I]t has become nearly an article of faith among both grand jury critics and
defenders that the grand jury is a 'rubber stamp' for the prosecution." Id. at 269.
Leipold writes that the grand jury is a weak screen because the jurors are unquali-
fied to answer the question which is the foundation of the grand jury: is there
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e In grand jury proceedings, the prosecution is allowed to pres-
ent any evidence in its possession. The prosecutor is not required
to disclose any evidence that might exonerate the accused, even if
that evidence is substantial. 82 Grand juries are prevented from
hearing conflicting facts, yet are expected to apply a legal standard
to the facts as presented. 83
Grand jury advocates point out that it is the job of the trial
jury, not the grand jury, to protect the innocent accused.8 4 While
this may be true for adult defendants, it is no protection for the de-
fendant who is a juvenile certified as an adult.8 5 Without a trans-
fer-back provision in the legislative waiver statute, a Minnesota
juvenile certified as an adult after a grand jury indictment can be
sentenced to an adult prison for an offense that otherwise would
have placed him under the supervision of the juvenile court.
D. Statutory Law in Other States
Minnesota is not alone in lacking a transfer-back provision in
its legislative waiver statute.86 In fact, only eleven of the thirty-
eight states with legislative waivers have explicit transfer-back
probable cause to believe that the suspect committed the specified crime? See id.
at 294. Not only are the jurors non-lawyers without experience in weighing legal
evidence, but they are expected to weigh that evidence after the only lawyer in the
room, the prosecutor, has told them it has merit. See id.
82. See U.S. v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (holding that a district court may
not dismiss an otherwise valid indictment on the ground that the government
failed to disclose to the jury "substantial exculpatory evidence" in its possession).
83. See generally Leipold, supra note 81, at 297 (commenting on the magnitude
of a grand juror's responsibilities). In addition, if a grand jury refuses to indict,
the prosecutor can simply seek an indictment from a new grand jury, using the
same evidence. See id. at 297 n.174.
84. See id. at 311. While this is an attractive position to take in light of the
more complicated alternatives, the author points out that the "do nothing" solution
inaccurately promotes the notion that the innocently overcharged are only tempo-
rarily harmed. See id. Leipold argues that the harm is not temporary because
many defendants who lack information or are vulnerable will enter guilty pleas
out of fear of uncertainty rather than let their chances play out at trial. See id.
In the case of a juvenile being automatically certified to adult court as a result
of a grand jury indictment, the potential weaknesses in the system are even more
harmful. Where there is no provision for a return or transfer-back to the jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile court if the juvenile is acquitted on the greater offense, the
grand jury indictment creates an unequal result. A youth convicted of second-
degree manslaughter, a crime that would normally come under the jurisdiction of
juvenile court, is given the maximum adult sentence because the grand jury in-
dicted him on first-degree murder.
85. The question concerning a juvenile who is certified through a grand jury to
adult court is not whether he will get a fair trial (as incredibly important as that
is), but whether he should be retained by the adult system if the charge is later
reduced.
86. See Sabo, supra note 21.
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provisions.8 7 In most states, the only option for transferring the
juvenile from adult court back to juvenile court exists pre-trial.88
Just as waiver statutes reflect each state's juvenile crime
policies and thus are as varied as each state's policies, so toO are
transfer-back provisions.8 9 Three examples of states with differing
transfer-back options are Wisconsin, Mississippi and West Vir-
ginia. The Wisconsin statute lists the following three conditions
under which a juvenile can return to juvenile court: 1) if there is a
lack of adequate treatment in adult prison; 2) if the transfer would
not mitigate the seriousness of the offense; and 3) if the transfer
would not lead other children to commit the same offense. 90 The
Mississippi statute provides that the juvenile may be returned to
"youth" court if he was not convicted of the certifying offense. 9'
87. See supra note 39 (listing 11 states' legislative waiver statutes containing
transfer-back provisions); see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 419C.361 (1996). This Oregon
statute provides that if the person "is found guilty of any lesser included offense
that is not itself a waivable offense, the trial court shall not sentence the defen-
dant therein, but the trial court shall order a pre-sentence report to be made in the
case [and], shall set forth in a memorandum such observations as the court may
make" regarding the case. Id. The trial court then shall return the case to the
juvenile court in order "that the juvenile court make disposition in the case based
upon the guilty finding in the court of waiver." Id.
88. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7306-1.1(E) (1996) (stating that "[tihe
accused person shall file a motion for certification as a child before the start of the
criminal preliminary hearing"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:25 (1994 & Supp.
1995) (stating that "the superior court shall determine, after hearing, whether
such person shall be treated as a juvenile under the provisions ... or whether the
case shall be disposed of according to regular criminal procedures"); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 1011(a)-(b) (Supp. 1994) (stating that when the Superior Court has
jurisdiction over a child defendant, "the Court may transfer the case to the Family
Court for trial and disposition if, in the opinion of the Court, the interests of justice
would be best served by such transfer").
89. Statutory law regulates sentencing policy. See State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d
560 (Minn. 1997). The Minnesota Supreme Court, in adjudicating the matter of
sentencing jurisdiction, centered its analysis entirely on the statutory language.
See id. at 566 (reasoning that silence in the Minnesota statutes prohibits a return
to juvenile jurisdiction for sentencing).
90. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 970.032 (West Supp. 1996). Wisconsin's statute pro-
vides:
[The [adult] court shall retain jurisdiction unless the child proves by a
preponderance of the evidence all of the following: (a) that, if convicted,
the child could not receive adequate treatment in the criminal justice sys-
tem. (b) That transferring jurisdiction to the court assigned to exercise ju-
risdiction under chapters 48 and 938 would not depreciate the seriousness
of the offense. (c) That retaining jurisdiction is not necessary to deter the
child or other children from committing the violation of which the child is
accused under the circumstances ....
Id.
91. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-157(8) (Supp. 1996) (stating "when the youth
has committed an act which is in original circuit court jurisdiction ... the jurisdic-
tion of the youth court over the youth is forever terminated, except that such ju-
risdiction is not forever terminated ... if a child who.. . is in the original jurisdic-
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The West Virginia statute allows the juvenile to appeal the trans-
fer to adult court even after conviction for the offense that led to
transfer.92
Other states that permit some limited return-to-juvenile-
court jurisdiction are Florida,93 Nevada 94 and Michigan. 95 In Ortez
v. Brousseau,96 the Florida District Court of Appeals allowed a ju-
venile to return to juvenile court because he was not convicted of
the felony that would have waived him into adult court.97 Ne-
vada's statute allows a return to juvenile jurisdiction under
"exceptional circumstances." 98 Michigan's automatic waiver stat-
tion of the circuit court is not convictec') (emphasis added).
92. See W. VA. CODE § 49-5-10(j) (Supp. 1996) (providing that "A juvenile who
has been transferred to criminal jurisdiction ... shall have the right to either di-
rectly appeal an order of transfer to the supreme court of appeals or to appeal such
order of transfer following a conviction of the offense of transfer") (emphasis added).
93. See Parr v. State, 415 So.2d 1353 (Fla. App. 1982) (holding that a juvenile
charged in adult court may move to be transferred before adjudication takes place
and must be granted the motion if he has not committed two delinquent acts, one
of which is a felony); I.H. v. State, 405 So.2d 450 (Fla. App. 1981) (holding that
failure to file information against juvenile in adult court did not divest juvenile
court of jurisdiction); Ortez v. Brousseau, 403 So.2d 549 (Fla. App. 1981) (granting
defendant's petition for a return to juvenile court because he had not committed
the requisite felony to bring him under adult court jurisdiction); Carter v. State,
382 So.2d 871 (Fla. App. 1980) (warning that motions to return a defendant to ju-
venile jurisdiction will be heard, but they must be made before the completed
process of adult jury trial).
94. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62.080 Subd. 4 (Michie 1996). Nevada's statute
reads:
If a child has been certified for criminal proceedings as an adult ... and
his case has been transferred out of the juvenile court, original jurisdic-
tion of his person for that case rests with the court to which the case has
been transferred and the child may petition for transfer back to the juve-
nile court only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.
Id. (emphasis added). The statute also requires the juvenile court judge to deter-
mine whether the exceptional circumstances warrant accepting jurisdiction. See
id.
95. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.1(3) (West 1996). Once a guilty plea or con-
viction is reached, the circuit judge must conduct a hearing to determine whether
the best interests of the juvenile and the public would be served by placing the of-
fender in a juvenile facility or adult prison. See id. Only under the automatic cer-
tification statute is this disposition hearing required. See People v. Veling, 504
N.W.2d 456, 463 n.19 (Mich. 1993).
96. 403 So.2d 450 (Fla. App. 1981).
97. See id. at 549.
98. See, e.g., Robert E. v. Justice Court of Reno, 664 P.2d 957 (Nev. 1983)
(holding that while a court cannot go beyond a statute in determining legislative
intent, it may interpret an ambiguous statute in light of public policy indicative of
legislative intent). Nevada's statute was challenged in the Nevada Supreme Court
on grounds of ambiguity. See id. The supreme court held that if a statute could be
interpreted in two or more different ways by reasonably well-informed persons, it
should be construed in line with what reason and public policy indicated the legis-
lature intended. See id. at 959 (quoting Cannon v. Taylor, 486 P.2d 493, 495 (Nev.
1971) (citing Madison Met. Sewer Dist. v. Dep't' of Natural Resources, 216 N.W.2d
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ute allows a prosecutor to try a juvenile in adult court if the juve-
nile is charged with one of nine enumerated offenses, 99 but re-
quires the circuit judge to conduct a sentencing hearing after ad-
judication. 00
E. Surrounding Case Law
The case law on the transfer-back issue is as varied as the
statutory law, 10 1 and cases involving disputes over which court
should have jurisdiction over a juvenile vary in their claims. For
example, in Partlow v. United States,10 2 there were multiple
charges, some of which were certifying offenses, and others that
were not. The juvenile in Partlow was tried as an adult, but when
the certifying offenses were dropped mid-trial, he asked to be
transferred back to juvenile court.103 The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals ruled that the defendant should stay in adult
court pending adjudication of all charges of the original com-
plaint.104 In Michigan v. Veling,10 5 the juvenile defendant, waived
to adult court by Michigan's prosecutorial waiver statute, 06 was
533, 535 (Wis. 1974)).
99. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.83. The enumerated offenses are: assault with
intent to murder, see id. § 750.83; assault with intent to commit armed robbery,
see id. § 750.89; attempted murder, see id. § 750.91; first-degree murder, see id. §
750.316; second-degree murder, see id. § 750.317; first-degree criminal sexual con-
duct, see id. § 750.520b; armed robbery, see id. § 750.529; delivery of a controlled
substance, see id. § 333.7401; and possession of a controlled substance, see id. §
333.7403.
100. See id. §§ 750.83-529. In Michigan, the circuit court judge is required to
provide the defendant with a hearing after the trial. The hearing determines
whether the juvenile should be sentenced in adult court or juvenile court.
101. Statutory law regulates sentencing policy. See State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d
560 (Minn. 1997). The Minnesota Supreme Court, in adjudicating the matter of
sentencing jurisdiction, centered its analysis entirely on the statutory language.
See id. at 566 (reasoning that silence in the Minnesota statute prohibits a return
to juvenile jurisdiction for sentencing); supra text accompanying notes 21-33
(providing a brief history of juvenile court and the ensuing tension between the
policy to rehabilitate juveniles and the policy to punish serious older juvenile of-
fenders). Adult criminal courts are very reluctant to give up sentencing authority
over certified juveniles between the ages of 15 and 18 who are charged with felony
level offenses. See id.
102. 673 A.2d 642 (D.C. 1996).
103. See id. at 644. "Appellant moved to have his case transferred back to the
Family Division arguing that since he was no longer 'charged' with a certifying
offense, the Criminal Division no longer had jurisdiction over his case." Id. The
court based its decision on Lucas v. United States, 522 A.2d 876 (D.C. 1987). Lu-
cas held that the court that began trial proceedings should see them through to
their conclusion and any transfer back should depend on the final conviction. See
id.
104. See Partlow, 673 A.2d at 642.
105. 504 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. 1993).
106. See id. (relating that Veling was indicted for assault with intent to commit
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ultimately convicted of a non-certifying offense. He moved for ju-
venile sentencing, 107 but the circuit court judge denied the motion.
On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the circuit court
judge violated the statute by not granting a sentencing hearing. 08
Other cases reflect still more views. In Tennessee, the court
held that the right to a transfer-back hearing is sufficiently fun-
damental to be considered a matter of due process in the context of
juvenile justice.109 The Delaware Supreme Court held that the
purpose of the transfer-back statute is "to provide juveniles with a
judicial counterweight to any perceived prosecutorial charging ex-
cess,"'110 and the reverse waiver was to eliminate the potential for
arbitrary or capricious charging decisions that could result in une-
qual treatment."'
II. The Facts and Minnesota Supreme Court's Decision in
State v. Behl
On January 20, 1995, sixteen-year-old Behl sawed off the
barrel of his father's twelve-gauge shotgun and took it to his friend
Ryan Postier's ("Postier") house in Pine Island, Minnesota. 112 Behl
owed money to Postier's older brother, Brad, who had agreed to ac-
cept the shotgun in lieu of payment. 113 Later that day in his base-
ment bedroom, Brad died from a single gunshot wound to his
head. 114 Behl and Postier were the only witnesses to the shoot-
ing."l5 Subsequent to the shooting, Behl and Postier fled the scene
in the dead man's truck." 6 After skidding into a ditch, the boys
continued on foot, discarding the shotgun along the way. 117 Later
murder, an enumerated offense, and sent to adult court).
107. See id. at 458. Following the indictment for assault with intent to commit
murder, Veling was convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm, which
is not a certifying offense. See id.
108. See id. at 458 n.5 (referring to Michigan, where the circuit court is re-
quired to provide the defendant with a hearing to determine which court should
have jurisdiction over sentencing).
109. See State v. Hale, 833 S.W.2d 65 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that in Tennessee,
indictment prior to a transfer hearing is a procedural defect that can be waived by
the juvenile).
110. Marine v. Delaware, 505 U.S. 1247 (1992) (holding in part that the statu-
tory scheme doesn't deny the defendant equal protection).
111. See id.
112. See State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 562 (Minn. 1997).
113. See letter from Donn H. Behl Sr., father of Donn Behl, to Paula Brummel
(Dec. 5, 1997) (on file with author).
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that afternoon, a sheriffs deputy found Behl and Postier and re-
turned each to their homes. 118 That evening, after the police dis-
covered Brad's body and questioned both boys, Behl confessed to
the shooting.'19
A grand jury indicted Behl on six criminal counts, including
first-degree murder. 120 Although Behl had no prior offenses, 121 un-
der Minnesota's legislative waiver statute122 the first-degree mur-
der indictment and his age (16) automatically certified him to
stand trial as an adult. 123 At trial, the jury found Behl not guilty
of first-degree murder, 124 but guilty of second-degree manslaugh-
ter, possession of a short-barreled shotgun and theft of a motor ve-
hicle. 125
Because Behl was found not guilty of first-degree murder (the
charge that had automatically certified him to stand trial, as an
adult), he requested to be returned to juvenile court.126 Behi re-
quested the transfer to obtain a hearing to determine whether the
juvenile or adult court would sentence him.127 Because Minne-
sota's legislative waiver statute is silent regarding the ability of a
juvenile to return to juvenile jurisdiction once certified as an
adult,128 the court denied Behl's request. 129 The sentencing judge
118. See id. at 563.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 562. It is common for prosecutors to charge the most serious of-
fense possible knowing they will need room to plea-bargain down. See supra note
56 (providing former prosecutors' experiences with overcharging); see also supra
Part I.C (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the grand jury indictment
system).
121. See Telephone interview with Thomas Gorman, Attorney for Donn Behl, in
Minneapolis, Minn. (Sept. 27, 1997) [hereinafter Gorman interview].
122. See supra note 17 (quoting Minnesota's automatic certification statute).
123. See State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, at 562 (Minn. 1997).
124. See State v. Behl, 547 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
125. The jury found Behl guilty of the following charges: manslaughter in the
second degree, MINN. STAT. § 609.205(1); theft of a motor vehicle, see id. § 609.52
subd. 2(17); and possession of a short-barreled shotgun, see id. § 609.67 subd. 2.
See also State v. Behl, 547 N.W.2d at 383. When the Minnesota Supreme Court
reviewed Behl's sentence, it determined that the possession of a shotgun charge
was not part of the same behavioral incident as the first-degree murder. As a re-
sult, it held that the district court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate that
charge. See Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 569.
126. See Behl, 547 N.W.2d at 384. "Behl moved the trial court to return his case
to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for sentencing and for a downward sen-
tencing departure based on the presentence investigation report." Id.
127. See id.
128. See supra note 17 (quoting Minnesota's automatic certification statute that
has no provision for the juvenile to transfer-back to juvenile jurisdiction if con-
victed of lesser charges).
129. See Behl, 547 N.W.2d at 382 (holding that district court jurisdiction over
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gave Behl a sentence fourteen months longer than the presump-
tive adult sentence for first-degree manslaughter. 13 0
Behl appealed the trial court's sentence. On appeal, the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals held that because the statute did not men-
tion a transfer-back provision, Behl should be sentenced in adult
court.' 3 ' Behl then appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court,
which in a four to three decision affirmed the court of appeals'
ruling. 3 2 The supreme court opinion addressed two main issues:
silence in the waiver statute about reversals of jurisdiction, and
the defendant's constitutional rights.133
A. The Supreme Court Decision
1. Statutory Silence
The Minnesota Supreme Court first addressed the jurisdic-
tional question as framed by the statute: 3 4 "it is undisputed that
the automatic certification statute is silent on the issue of disposi-
tion following a conviction for a crime other than first-degree mur-
der. We must, therefore, start our analysis by considering the sig-
nificance of this silence."'135 In writing the court's majority opinion,
Justice Tomljanovich interpreted the silence of the statute to mean
Behl was properly attained through grand jury indictment and should properly
remain with district court even though the jury had found Behl guilty of a lesser
included offense).
130. See id. The pre-sentence investigation report recommended that Behl re-
ceive the presumptive sentence for each offense. See id. This would have resulted
in 58 months for the manslaughter conviction and 12 months and one day for the
offense of possession of a short-barreled shotgun. See id. Instead, the court sen-
tenced Behl to 12 months and one day, plus 72 months, to be served concurrently.
See id. His sentence for manslaughter was 25% longer than the recommended
(presumptive) sentence for that offense. See id. The court justified its upward de-
parture in light of four factors. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Behl's
attorney stated:
All kinds of people who knew Donny came to his pre-sentence hearing to
testify that he was basically a good kid. Teachers, counselors, someone
from his church; there was a lot of testimony to support that he only get
the minimum presumptive adult sentence. I don't understand why the
court gave him a fourteen month upward departure.
Gorman interview, supra note 121; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text
(showing that Behl's sentence was harsher than those received by many adults).
131. See Behl, 547 N.W.2d at 385 (holding that since the legislature chose not to
include a transfer-back feature in the statute, the court ought not fabricate one).
132. See State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 560 (Minn. 1997).
133. See id.
134. See id. at 564. The court began its analysis by determining whether the
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that the drafters did not intend to allow certified juveniles to re-
turn to juvenile court. 136 For support, Justice TomIjanovich cited
an analogous statute from Oregon 137 that provides a transfer-back
option; the supreme court concluded that the lack of similar trans-
fer-back language in the Minnesota statute prohibited such an op-
tion. 138
The Court also looked to the explicit sentencing provisions in
Minnesota's EJJ statute,139 which was incorporated in the same
legislative bill as the certification statute. 140 The EJJ statute is
explicit about the sentencing structure for juveniles who come un-
der its rubric and allows the juvenile a method to challenge EJJ.141
The court concluded, however, if the same legislature that pro-
136. See id. at 564-67 (explaining that the statutory omission of a transfer-back
provision is more likely to be intentional and unambiguous than inadvertent and
ambiguous).
137. See Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 565-66. The majority opinion stated:
the trial court shall not sentence the defendant therein, but ... shall or-
der a pre-sentence report to be made in the case, shall set forth in a
memorandum such observations as the court may make regarding the
case and shall then return the case to the juvenile court in order that the
juvenile court make disposition in the case based upon the guilty finding
in the court of waiver.
Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 419C.361 (1995)).
138. See id. "The fact that Oregon's legislature included within the statute a
specific clause providing for a return to juvenile court of an automatically certified
juvenile actually indicates that a lack of similar language in the Minnesota statute
prohibits such a return." Id. The court of appeals had relied upon similar logic
when it stated that, "[w]hile we believe that the option of a hearing could enhance
protection of the 'best interest' of some juvenile offenders, our legislature has not
included this feature in our statute, and it is not our function to amend it." Behl,
547 N.W.2d at 385.
139. See Behl 564 N.W.2d at 566 (citing MNN. STAT. § 260.015 (1994)).
140. The House proposed a bill:
providing for adult court jurisdiction over juveniles alleged to have com-
mitted first degree murder after age 16; providing for presumptive certifi-
cation to adult court for juveniles over age 16 alleged to have committed
other prison-level felonies or any felony while using a firearm; [and]
authorizing the court or the prosecutor to designate a juvenile an ex-
tended jurisdiction juvenile.
MINN. H.F. 2074, 78th Leg., (1994).
The Senate bill did not contain an automatic certification provision, but pro-
posed "providing for presumptive certification to adult court for juveniles alleged to
have committed prison-level felonies . . .extending juvenile court jurisdiction to
age 23 for serious youthful offenders; [and] limiting certification to adult court to
felony offenses." MINN. S.F. 1845, 78th Leg., (1994).
141. The EJJ statute outlines dispositions for juveniles found guilty, and those
later convicted of an offense after trial. See MNN. STAT. § 260.126 subd. 4 (1996).
Additionally, the EJJ statute provides guidelines for the execution of the adult
sentence when the juvenile violates his stayed sentence conditions. See id. at
subd. 5. In this subdivision, the statute provides for notification to the juvenile as




vided so explicitly for juvenile adjudication in the EJJ statute had
wanted a transfer-back provision in the certification statute, it
would have explicitly included one. 142
2. Constitutional Issues
Behl demanded his return to juvenile court jurisdiction as a
constitutional right, arguing the violation of his procedural and
substantive due process rights. 143 In response to Beh's first claim
that his procedural due process rights had been violated, the court
responded that such a claim could succeed only if the loss of a pro-
tectable liberty or property interest were established. 144 Behl
failed to convince the court that his adjudication in juvenile court
was a protectable right or interest, since he had never been under
its jurisdiction. 145
In response to Beh's second claim that his substantive due
process rights had been violated, the court articulated the stan-
dard of judicial scrutiny for legislative enactments when no fun-
damental right is at stake. 146 The court asserted that the statute
was a "reasonable means to a permissive object,"'147 and that adju-
dication in juvenile court is not a fundamental right. 148 Applying a
142. See Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 566.
Likewise, the explicit sentencing provisions in the EJJ statute, which
was part of the same bill as Minnesota Statute section 260.015, indi-
cate that the legislature's silence on the issue was intentional and
unambiguous .... Had the legislature intended the district court to
adjudicate such defendants as juveniles, it is probable the legislature
would have done as it did with the EJJ statute and explicitly provided
for an adjudication.
Id.
While the EJJ statute was drafted during the same legislative session as the
automatic certification statute, they did not evolve from the same sources. The
EJJ category grew out of the Task Force Report, and the legislative waiver, or
automatic certification statute, did not; it was a modification of the pre-existing
certification statute.
143. See Behl, 547 N.W.2d at 384. One of the issues on appeal was whether the
district court violated Behl's constitutional rights by retaining jurisdiction for sen-
tencing. See id.
144. See Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 566.
145. See id. at 567 (concluding on the procedural due process issue, that until
the juvenile court has asserted its jurisdiction over a person, it does not possess a
protectable interest). In Behl's case, he was never under the juvenile court juris-
diction, so he never "lost" its jurisdiction. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 567 (citing Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732, 741 (Minn. 1979)
(stating that substantive due process requires that statutes not be arbitrary or ca-
pricious)).
148. See id. (holding that no person, regardless of age, has a fundamental right
to juvenile adjudication). By establishing rational basis as the level of judicial
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rational basis standard of scrutiny, the court concluded that trying
juveniles charged with first-degree murder as adults is a reason-
able means to the permissive object of adjudicating the most seri-
ous offenders. 149
Beh's third constitutional challenge concerned equal protec-
tion.150 Behl asserted that because sentencing two juveniles con-
victed of the same offense to radically different penalties is not ra-
tionally related to any legitimate government interest, such
disparate sentencing violated his constitutional right to equal pro-
tection. 151 In addressing Behl's argument, the court acknowledged
that the only reason he received a harsher sentence than another
juvenile convicted of second-degree manslaughter was because he
had been indicted for first-degree murder. 152 The court readily ac-
knowledged that Behl did not commit the offense for which he was
indicted. 153 While the court admitted that the state failed to argue
successfully the rational basis on which to justify this disparate
treatment,154 it attributed the rational basis for the disparate sen-
tencing to the indictment process and the grand jury's finding of
scrutiny that should be applied to the statute, the court easily upheld the lower
court's decision.
149. See id. at 566. The court acknowledged that, in at least one case, the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals had justified using offenses to certify juveniles to adult
court. See id. (citing In re Welfare of L.J.S. and J.T.K., 539 N.W.2d 408, 412-13
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995)). The court also cited a Delaware case, Marine v. State, 607
A.2d 1185, 1207 (Del. 1992), that held that the statutory scheme distinguishing
offenses does not involve a fundamental right, and an Illinois case, People v. Jiles,
251 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ill. 1969), that held that the creation of a juvenile court sys-
tem is not a constitutional requirement. See id. at 567. "As a result," the Behl
court stated, "we conclude that such a finding is at least a rational basis upon
which to expose a juvenile who is within two years of becoming a legal adult to the
more harsh sentences imposed in district court." Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 569.
150. See Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 568. The Minnesota Supreme Court does not cite
to precedent on this issue; however, it is significant to note that the United States
Supreme Court and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals have held that there
is no fundamental right to receive a sentence equal to that received by a person
convicted of the same offense. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114
(1979) (applying rational basis review to an equal protection challenge of a statute
that assigned different prison sentences to two individuals who committed the
same offense); see also United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
151. See Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 568.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 569. The trial court jury found Behl not guilty of first-degree
murder, but guilty of second-degree manslaughter. See id. at 560.
154. See id. "Although the state failed at oral argument to assert a rational ba-
sis upon which to base this different treatment, we conclude that the grand jury's
finding of probable cause necessary to automatically certify a juvenile provides
such a basis." Id. The supreme court justified its rational basis review on a grand
jury indictment-a process already discussed for its inherent one-sidedness. See
supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
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probable cause. 155 Because no fundamental right was at stake, and
no suspect class existed,156 the court justified a completely deferen-
tial standard of analysis.157 It concluded that while it would have
been preferable to have a transfer-back option for Behl, 158 it was
nevertheless rational to impose an adult sentence upon a sixteen-
year-old whose conduct was grave enough to invoke a first-degree
murder indictment. 15 9 Responding to Behl's challenges that sen-
tencing him in adult court was unconstitutional, the supreme court
held that Minnesota statutes are presumed constitutional and
should only be challenged when absolutely necessary.' 60
Chief Justice Keith dissented from the opinion on three
grounds. 161 First, he asserted that the opinion had misinterpreted
the legislative intent and statutory silence in ways that conflicted
with "simple but fundamental notions of fairness."'162 Justice Keith
stated that when a youth, "alleged" to have committed first-degree
murder, is excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction, that same
youth should be returned to juvenile jurisdiction when the allega-
tion disappears. 6 3 Second, he accused the majority of failing to
apply the well-established rule of lenity by interpreting the stat-
ute's ambiguity to the disadvantage of the accused. 164 Third, he
155. See id. at 569 (noting that the conditions for automatic certification include
a grand jury indictment for first-degree murder).
156. See id. at 568. "Facial distinctions based on age and charged offenses do
not create suspect classifications." Id. (quoting United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d
1329, 1336-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
157. See Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 569.
158. See id. at 568 (stating that while a specific legislative provision for defen-
dants like Behl might be preferable, the failure of such a provision is not arbitrary
and capricious).
159. See id. (referring to Behl as a juvenile "over the age of 16"); see also id. at
569 (emphasizing that a 16 year-old juvenile is within two years of becoming a le-
gal adult).
160. See id. at 566 (quoting In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989)).
The opinion further stated: "to challenge successfully the constitutional validity of
a statute, the challenger bears the very heavy burden of demonstrating beyond a
reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional." Id. (quoting State v. Mer-
rill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. 1990)).
161. See id. at 570-72.
162. See id. at 570. Chief Justice Keith wrote: "If... the statute is silent and
we must identify the legislature's intent, then I see no reason to prefer the more
punitive result over a juvenile disposition." Id. at 571.
163. See id. (agreeing that although it was reasonable to remove a child from
juvenile court based on a serious allegation, the jurisdiction of the adult court
should have been terminated when the jury rejected the allegation).
164. See id. The rule of lenity states that, in criminal cases, a law with the pur-
pose of punishment must be construed strictly and interpreted with a very critical
mind. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, 655-56 (2d ed.
1995). If there is any ambiguity in the statute, the court must interpret the stat-
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criticized the majority for concluding that because Oregon's certifi-
cation statute and Minnesota's EJJ statute both had transfer-back
provisions, the lack of one in Minnesota's certification statute was
intentional.165
III. Analysis
The issue in Behl was not whether Donn Behl should be tried
as an adult. 166 The issue was whether he should have received the
adult sentence for second-degree manslaughter after the first-
degree murder charge became a conviction for a lesser offense.
167
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision to affirm the adult sen-
tence of Behl for a conviction of second-degree manslaughter was
unjust for several reasons. First, it interpreted the ambiguities of
this statute to the disadvantage of the accused. 1 8 Second, the
court failed to recognize that the statute in question violates the
ute so the individual is not unfairly penalized. See id. The Behl dissent asserted
that for any ambiguities concerning the scope of the automatic certification stat-
ute, the legislative intent and past interpretive practices should be followed, and
that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court should prevail. See Behl, 564 N.W.2d at
571 n.3 (Keith, C.J., dissenting) (citing United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 305-
08 (1992) (holding that the "venerable" rule of lenity is relevant when statutory
language, structure, legislative history and underlying policies are inconclusive)).
165. See Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 570. It is illogical to conclude that the Minnesota
Legislature intended adult courts to retain jurisdiction over juveniles acquitted of
the certifying offense simply because Oregon provides for a transfer-back to juve-
nile court. In fact, most states neglect to provide for situations like Behl's. See
supra Part I.D (examining the differences between state juvenile justice statutes).
The Behl dissent found it puzzling that the Minnesota Supreme Court referred
to the EJJ statute in its reasoning. See Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 570. It accused the
majority of completely misunderstanding the statute, asserting that the EJJ sys-
tem has no avenue for a return to juvenile court as the majority contends. See id.
On the contrary, the EJJ provisions allow a juvenile to remain under juvenile ju-
risdiction with an adult sentence hanging over his head. The EJJ statute does not
discuss or relate to district court sentencing jurisdiction in automatic certification
cases. See id.
166. Although Behl's father claimed that his son is innocent in a letter to the
author, fairness of his trial was not the issue on appeal. The issue on appeal, be-
fore both the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court, was
whether Behl should have received an adult sentence for second-degree man-
slaughter. See id. at 561; Behl, 547 N.W.2d at 384 (identifying sentencing as the
central issue in both cases).
167. See Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 18, at 286 n.398 (citing commentary to
the rule on automatic certification, which states that once in adult court, the pro-
ceedings remain there). What is unclear from this commentary is whether pro-
ceedings include sentencing.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 135-139 (referring to court's interpreta-
tion of statutory silence and its holding based on that interpretation). In the case
of criminal statutes where the freedom of an accused person is at stake, courts
have long recognized the interpretive rule of lenity which says ambiguous statutes
must be interpreted in a light most favorable to the accused. See supra note 164
and accompanying text (explaining the rule of lenity).
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Minnesota Constitution because of vagueness. Third, the court's
decision negated both the policy upon which the juvenile court sys-
tem was founded and the legislative intent of the automatic certifi-
cation statute.169 Finally, it violated Beh's guarantee of equal pro-
tection of the laws, a guarantee that requires the state to treat all
similarly situated persons alike. 170 Today, under the Behl holding,
two sixteen-year-old first-time offenders can both be convicted of
second-degree manslaughter, but receive drastically different sen-
tences.
A. Statutory Silence and the Canons of Interpretation
The absence of a statutory transfer-back provision was more
likely the result of legislative oversight than legislative intent.
The Behl holding concludes that because the legislature did not in-
clude a transfer-back provision in its certification statute, it in-
tended certified juveniles to go to prison even for juvenile-level
convictions. When the Minnesota Legislature examined such is-
sues as presumptive certification, automatic certification and
prima facia certification, it is not unthinkable that they simply
overlooked a transfer-back provision. Literature analyzing the
evolution of the juvenile justice system is replete with complex is-
sues comparing and contrasting the rehabilitation and sentencing
of juveniles with the rights of the public to be safe and crime-
free.171 Prior to the enactment of the statute, House and Senate
committees debated politically charged issues such as the age
boundaries for certification, and which felonies, if any, ought to be
included in a waiver statute. As legislators debated which juve-
niles should be tried as adults and which should remain under ju-
venile jurisdiction, it would not be surprising if they overlooked a
transfer-back provision. 7 2 The resultant statutory silence may
simply have been accidental.
169. See supra Part I.B (giving background of the juvenile court system and the
evolution of the automatic certification statute).
170. See supra notes 150-159 and accompanying text (citing Behrs equal protec-
tion challenge and the argument the court used to refute the challenge).
171. See, e.g., Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 18, at 966-67 (reviewing the juve-
nile court system in Minnesota and the impact of the Minnesota Juvenile Justice
Task Force); see also Arteaga, supra note 21, at 216 (analyzing the various forms of
juvenile court systems throughout the United States).
172. Tape recordings and transcripts of judicial committee hearings from Feb-
ruary 28, 1994, show that the following issues were the most pressing: which of-
fenses, if any, should automatically certify a juvenile; what age the juvenile should
be; what role public safety should play in the certification process; and what rights
the juvenile should have to a jury or counsel. See HEARINGS ON MINN. H.F. 2074
BEFORE THE JUDICIARY CONFERENCE COMM., 78th Leg., (Feb. 28, & Mar. 2, 1994)
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The Behl holding consciously disregarded the rule of lenity.
The rule of lenity dictates that where a criminal statute is am-
biguous, it must be interpreted in the light most favorable to the
criminal defendant. 73 The court misapplied the rule of lenity by
holding that because the statute did not expressly contain a trans-
fer-back provision, Behl could not return to juvenile court jurisdic-
tion. The supreme court held that a lack of transfer-back language
was intentional,174 and thus interpreted the statute's silence in the
light most punitive to Behl.
Another canon of statutory interpretation that the supreme
court misused is expressio unius, meaning the expression of one
thing can exclude another; because something was excluded from a
list, it is not part of the list. 175 The defense cited an Oregon certifi-
cation statute which allows juveniles to return to juvenile court for
a sentencing hearing. The Oregon statute is similar to Minne-
sota's certification statute except in the return provision. The
court held that "a lack of similar language in the Minnesota stat-
ute prohibits such a return."'176 The court concluded that had the
Minnesota legislature intended a transfer-back provision, it would
have imitated Oregon. One only has to look at the state to state
differences in juvenile certification statutes to appreciate the con-
fusion surrounding the issue. 177 The Minnesota Supreme Court
likewise asserted that because the Minnesota legislature enacted
the explicitly detailed EJJ statute and certification statute at the
same time, any omissions in the automatic certification statute
must have been intentional. 78 The court misapplied expressio
unius when it concluded that because Oregon's waiver statute had
a transfer-back provision, 179 absence of the same provision in Min-
nesota's statute was intentional; because the EJJ statute was so
(transcribed by and on file with the author).
173. See supra note 164 (explaining the rule of lenity).
174. See State v. Behl, 547 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
175. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
176. State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 565-66 (Minn. 1997).
177. See supra notes 35 & 37 (citing the judicial and legislative waiver statutes
respectively).
178. See supra notes 134-142 and accompanying text (showing the Minnesota
Supreme Court's reasoning that statutory silence equals legislative intent).
179. See OR. REV. STAT. § 419C.361 (1995). Because Oregon and Minnesota
statutes were passed by different Legislatures, it is imprudent to compare their
provisions as if they derived from the same legislative body. Comparing Minne-
sota's EJJ statute to Minnesota's automatic certification statute is also ill-advised.
While both statutes concerned juvenile crime, they addressed different problems,
proposed different remedies and evolved from different backgrounds. The EJJ
statute came directly from the Task Force's SYO category, whereas the automatic




detailed, the companion waiver statute must be as detailed as the
drafters had intended. 180 Statutes are as diverse as the legisla-
tures that create them; legislatures are as diverse as the legisla-
tors who compose them; and legislators reflect the fears, concerns
and desires of very diverse constituents. As has been demon-
strated, waiver statutes among the fifty states are very diverse, 81
and bills that are introduced in one format are often passed in a
very different format. Concluding that the Minnesota statute did
not intend certified juveniles to transfer-back to juvenile court be-
cause it did not imitate the Oregon or EJJ statutes is like reason-
ing that an apple does not contain seeds because it does not look
like an orange or a tangerine.
B. Minnesota's Legislative Waiver Violates the Minnesota
Constitution
When the language of a statute is ambiguous, legislative in-
tent may be used as a guide to decipher statutory meaning, 8 2 but
when a statute is so ambiguous that "men of common intelligence
must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,"'8 3 that
statute necessarily violates the Minnesota constitution. 8 4 The su-
preme court should have questioned the constitutionality of the
legislative waiver statute where application of its ambiguous
meaning could lead to such different results for a juvenile: incar-
ceration in adult prison or rehabilitation through the juvenile jus-
180. See Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 566; see also supra note 142 and accompanying
text (quoting the majority opinion's conclusion that if the Minnesota legislature
had wanted a transfer-back option, they would have included one).
181. See supra notes 35 & 37. There does not appear to be any uniformity
among states regarding waiver statutes, or whether those waivers have transfer-
back provisions.
182. See DMNN. STAT. § 645.16 (1996). Minnesota's statute provides:
When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are
clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disre-
garded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit. When the words of a law
are not explicit, the intention of the legislature may be ascertained by
considering, among other matters: (1) The occasion and necessity for the
law; (2) The circumstances under which it was enacted; (3) The mischief to
be remedied; (4) The object to be attained; (5) The former law, if any, in-
cluding other laws upon the same or similar subjects; (6) The conse-
quences of a particular interpretation; (7) The contemporaneous legisla-
tive history; and (8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of the
statute.
Id.
183. MINN. CONST. art. VII § 8. "A criminal statute which either forbids or re-
quires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first
essential of due process of law." Id.
184. See id.
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tice system. Because the statute requires the court to "guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application," it "violates the first es-
sential of due process of law." 185
C. The Opinion Offends Public Policy and Negates
Legislative Intent
The existence of a separate justice system for juveniles testi-
fies to society's desire to adjudicate juveniles differently than
adults.18 6 Minnesota legislators enacted the EJJ category in re-
sponse to this desire, allowing serious offenders to remain under
the watchful eye of the juvenile court until they are twenty-one
years old. 8 7 The same legislators enacted the legislative waiver
statute to include only one offense: first-degree murder.188 The in-
tent of the Minnesota legislature, demonstrated by the EJJ statute
and the legislative waiver statute was to retain juveniles in juve-
nile court unless they are chronic, serious, older or unrehabilita-
tive offenders.
Donn Behl was not a chronic offender; this crime was his first
offense. The jury convicted him of second-degree manslaughter, a
crime that is considered not as serious as murder, but more serious
than justifiable homicide. 189 "[Mianslaughter is a crime which is
separate and distinct from, rather than merely a degree of, the
crime of murder."'190 While Behl's crime was serious, Minnesota's
statute for manslaughter in the second-degree contains language
of "risk," "negligence," and "chance."'' 1 Having an element of risk
or recklessness is characteristic to criminal negligence, and clearly
Behl is guilty of risky behavior. However, risky juvenile behavior,
185. MNN. CONST. art. VII § 8.
186. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text (outlining the societal rea-
sons for the creation of a separate justice system for juveniles). The two justice
systems exist because society recognizes the need to treat juveniles differently
from adults. Most juveniles are considered amenable to treatment because of their
youth. Only first-degree murder has been recognized as serious enough to certify a
juvenile to be tried as an adult. A juvenile is not to be tried as an adult if first-
degree murder was only "attempted." See supra note 38 (quoting the automatic
certification statute and highlighting the second half of the sentence excluding at-
tempted first-degree murder).
187. See supra note 18 (describing the elements of the EJJ statute).
188. See supra Part I.B (discussing the creation of the legislative waiver stat-
ute).
189. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.9 (2d. ed.
1986) (defining the classification of manslaughter). "[Manslaughter constitutes a
sort of catch-all category which includes homicides which are not bad enough to be
murder but which are too bad to be no crime whatever." Id.
190. Id.
191. See MINN. STAT. § 609.205(1) (1996).
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even criminally negligent juvenile behavior, is exactly why we
have a juvenile justice system. Society acknowledges that juve-
niles take risks, that some are downright reckless, and sometimes
death results. Society, nevertheless, rejected the notion that we
should unequivocally incarcerate juveniles when their risky be-
havior accidentally results in death. Society prefers to teach juve-
niles how to control, change or stop their risky behavior. The
Minnesota Supreme Court failed the juvenile justice system by ig-
noring the premises on which it exists: we know juveniles are go-
ing to make mistakes and we choose to rehabilitate them if possi-
ble, rather than incarcerate them as adults. The supreme court
failed to offer Behl the opportunity to learn from his mistake and
chose instead to leave him incarcerated in adult prison.
D. Different Sentences for the Same Offense
Consider the following: Two sixteen year old juveniles (A and
B) receive convictions for second-degree manslaughter. The sen-
tencing court gives juvenile "A" a seventy-two month prison sen-
tence, but designates juvenile "B" EJJ, imposing treatment and
probation until he is twenty-one. 192 The inequity in their sen-
tences is not because of their age, prior offense record or threat to
society. The inequity is the direct result of the prosecutorial
charging system and a grand jury indictment.
The Minnesota Supreme Court argued that it is rational to
impose an adult sentence upon a sixteen-year-old whose conduct is
grave enough to result in a first-degree murder indictment.193 The
court correctly states that there is no fundamental right to receive
the same sentence as another individual charged with the same
crime, therefore, an equal protection argument is unlikely to pre-
vail.194 Nevertheless, as the dissent points out, the court's inter-
pretation conflicts with "simple but fundamental notions of fair-
ness"'195 and should not have prevailed.
192. See id. § 260.015 subd. 5(b); see also supra note 18 and accompanying text
(describing the EJJ statute).
193. See supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text (explaining the court's jus-
tification for applying a rational basis review to Beh's equal protection claims and
thereby rejecting them).




ADULT TIME FOR JUVENILE CRIME
IV. Proposal for a Solution
This Article proposes a deceptively simple solution to a tragi-
cally unjust statutory oversight: amend the automatic certification
statute to include a transfer-back provision for juveniles like
Behl.1 96 A statutory provision for a transfer-back to juvenile court
for a sentencing hearing would eliminate a sentencing injustice as
the one found in Behl.
Such a transfer-back provision could be narrowly tailored so
that a juvenile acquitted of first-degree murder receives a sen-
tencing hearing to determine whether the juvenile should be re-
turned to juvenile court or retained in adult court for sentencing.
Criteria for making such a determination could be the juvenile's
age, amenability to rehabilitation and prior offenses. If the court
then determined that the juvenile should be transferred to juvenile
jurisdiction, the transfer-back provision could stipulate that the
juvenile be automatically designated EJJ status. The court could
then stay the adult sentence until the juvenile completed his dis-
position or turned twenty-one. This provision would protect the
juvenile's equal protection rights, prevent unequal sentencing of
similarly situated juveniles, and would place a check on potential
abuse of the prosecutorial and indictment systems. It would also
preserve society's interest in punishing serious juvenile offenders.
Minnesota Statute § 260.015 subd. 5(b) (1996) should be
amended as follows:
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
MINNESOTA:
Subd. 5(b) is amended to read:
No person described in § 260.015 Subd. 5(b) who is con-
victed as an adult shall thereafter be subject to the ju-
risdiction of the juvenile court provided, however, that
any person described in Subd. 5(b) who is acquitted of
first-degree murder, but is convicted of a lesser included
offense, shall be subiect, after a hearing, to iuvenile
court jurisdiction for disposition and for subsequent un-
lawful conduct other than that governed by Subd. 5(b).
This amendment would clearly tell courts what to do with ju-
veniles charged with first-degree murder, but convicted of a lesser
charge. It would save the judicial branch from crossing over into
legislative territory. The amendment would, most importantly,
eliminate the possibility of a juvenile going to prison because of
196. The proposal is not a new one. See Feld, supra note 23, at 617, subd. 3.
Professor Feld proposed such an amendment in his article.
1998]
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prosecutorial overcharging and would honor the purpose of the ju-
venile justice system.
Conclusion
If states draft legislative waiver statutes for juveniles
charged with felony-level offenses, states should also provide for a
return to juvenile jurisdiction if that charge is removed. The basis
for this assertion rests on the public policy that led to the creation
of the juvenile justice system, 197 and the equal protection guaran-
tee of the United States Constitution. If the charge of an enumer-
ated offense properly and legally brings a juvenile under the juris-
diction of the adult court, it follows that jurisdiction should be
reevaluated when that charge is no longer active. The opportunity
for a transfer-back to juvenile court should be offered in a sen-
tencing hearing.
There has always been tension between the public policy of
adjudicating juveniles separately from adults, and the policy to
punish the older, most serious juvenile offenders as adults. This
Article does not take issue with Minnesota's EJJ statute or auto-
matic cerfication statute. This Article does argue, however, that
the Minnesota Legislature neglected to incorporate an important
safety valve in its certification statute. This oversight caused a
sixteen-year-old boy to go to adult prison for five years for a first-
offense conviction of second-degree manslaughter. If the Minne-
sota courts are to prevent other juveniles going to adult prison for
similar convictions, this oversight must be corrected. Such a seri-
ous sentencing injustice must not be repeated.
The legislators who drafted the bills for the EJJ and legisla-
tive waiver statute should now amend the automatic certification
statute. In a time when the public is pleading for an end to serious
juvenile crime, a legislator may invoke harsh criticism from a pub-
lic that perceives her or him to be "soft on crime." Nevertheless,
sentencing a juvenile to adult prison for second-degree manslaugh-
ter contradicts public policy and legislative intent. To be consis-
tent with juvenile justice policy and notions of fair sentencing,
Minnesota Statute 260.015 subd. 5(b) must be amended to include
an explicit transfer-back provision.
197. See supra notes 21o27 and accompanying text (explaining the evolution of
the juvenile justice system).
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